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 This paper investigates cross-country evidence on how capital market affects 
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of finance and growth, empirical work on the relationship between finance and 
volatility has been relatively scarce. Theoretically, more developed capital market 
should lead to lower macroeconomic volatility. The major finding is that countries 
with more developed capital market have smoother economic fluctuations. Results are 
generated using panel estimation technique with panel data from 44 countries 
covering the years 1975 through 2004. 
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Capital Market and Business Cycle Volatility 
1. Introduction 
The role of financial development in economic growth and stability has, for many 
years, been the subject of intense discussion and debate among both academicians and 
policy makers. The mainstream view [Demirguc-kunt and Levine (2001)] is that 
financial development exerts a large positive impact on economic growth. Moreover, 
this link holds even after controlling for other growth determinants and possible 
endogeneity. Many researchers also have sought to evaluate the links between capital 
market development (usually stock market) and growth, or between a relative measure 
of capital market development as captured by a financial structure index which 
measures the degree to which a financial system is bank-based or market-based, and 
growth. Interestingly, Demirguc-kunt and Levine (2001) found that financial structure 
does not have any explanatory power after controlling for the level of overall financial 
development. However, Beck and Levine (2002) do find that stock markets and banks 
are both individually significant in explaining economic growth. This would suggest 
that both markets and banks independently spur growth, and that stock markets 
provide different financial services from banks. 
 Traditional explanations of the connection between financial development and 
volatility are based prominently on the phenomena of credit market imperfections and 
asymmetric information. The “balance sheet view” [Bernanke and Gertler (1995), 
Bernanke et al. (1998)] postulates that nominal and real shocks to the economy are 
amplified by a “financial accelerator.” Basically, the fall in a firm’s net worth 
resulting from an initial shock (say, from a monetary contraction) increases agency 
costs by worsening the potential conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. 
This leads subsequently to higher external financing premiums, which in turn magnify 
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the fluctuations in borrowing, spending and investment. Therefore, to the extent that a 
more advanced financial system reduces this imperfection, it decreases the volatility 
of business cycles. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) also argue that efficient financial 
markets mitigate information asymmetries and enable economic agents to process 
information more effectively, resulting in lower growth volatility. 
 Unlike traditional theory, recent explanations focus more on specific 
mechanisms rather than on asymmetric information. For instance, Aghion et al. 
(1999) show theoretically that combining financial market imperfections with unequal 
access to investment opportunities across individuals can generate endogenous and 
permanent fluctuations in aggregate GDP, investment, and interest rates. Thus, 
reducing inequality of access and financial imperfection are necessary conditions for 
macroeconomic stability. In another important contribution Acemoglu and Zilibotti 
(1997) argue that the presence of indivisible projects limits the degree of 
diversification that an economy can achieve in the early stages of development,. The 
inability to diversify idiosyncratic risk, and the desire to avoid high risk investments, 
slow down capital accumulation and introduce large uncertainty into the growth 
process. By providing a closer match between savers and investors and promoting 
diversification, financial deepening reduces risk and dampens cyclical fluctuations. 
 Larrain (2004) develops a theoretical model which predicts that the effect of 
financial development on output volatility is ambiguous. The model shows that the 
effect depends on particular circumstances that constrain, firm financing's decisions. 
If firms need funds to smooth unfavourable cash-flow shocks, financial development 
reduces output volatility. In contrast, if firms need funds to expand production when 
confronted with positive investment opportunities, financial development increases 
output volatility. Thus, knowing whether the effect of financial development on 
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volatility is positive or negative permits inferences to be drawn about the type of 
shock that firms are facing. 
 Theoretically, the resilience of an economy is affected not only by the overall 
level of financial development but also by its financial structure - whether it is bank-
based or market-based. Rajan and Zingales (2001) observe that “if there is one thing 
the arm’s-length system (market-based) can do better than the relationship-based 
(bank-based), it is to bear and manage macroeconomic risk.” They argue that due to 
low transparency and disclosure, assets in a bank-based system tend to be less liquid. 
Intermediaries (mainly banks) finance such assets by low cost demand deposit. This 
exposure makes them subject to runs. In other words, financing of illiquid assets in a 
bank-based system is likely to create a maturity mismatch in the portfolios of 
intermediaries. This financial fragility of intermediaries would then impose risk on the 
financial system.  
 They argue further that should a relationship-based system suffer adverse 
shocks that the government is not able to counter, then the flow of credit can quickly 
collapse. They give the following reasons. First, there is a lot of specific knowledge 
embedded in relationships between failing intermediaries and their clients. Therefore, 
other healthy intermediaries cannot easily replace them in providing any further credit 
to debtors of the failing ones. Secondly, since property rights are not well established 
in non-transparent relationships, it becomes hard for depositors and investors to 
distinguish between healthy and failing parties. This could lead to financial contagion 
among intermediaries and also give rise to bank runs. 
 In contrast, in market-based systems, transparency and disclosure are required 
to give investors the confidence to invest directly in particular firms. This greater 
transparency improves the ability of a system to withstand shocks. Healthy firms can 
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be distinguished from the terminally ill after a shock and can be dealt with differently. 
As a result, outside investors or intermediaries have the ability to invest and rescue 
the system from the consequences of failing financial intermediaries. 
 Haan et al. (1999) extend these ideas by developing a formal model of the 
propagation of business cycle shocks, given the existence of long-term relationships 
between entrepreneurs and lenders (which are more prevalent in bank-based system). 
Lenders may be constrained in their short-run access to liquidity, and when liquidity 
is low, relationships are subject to break-ups that lead to loss of joint surplus. In this 
way, feedbacks between aggregate investment and the structure of intermediation 
greatly magnify the effects of shocks. The authors show that, for large shocks, 
financial collapse is unavoidable unless external interventions occur. 
 Fecht (2004) developed a theoretical model which shows that in a market-
based system, banks only provide access to efficient investment to unsophisticated 
households, whereas in a bank-based system bank deposit contracts also offer some 
degree of liquidity insurance. Consequently, in a bank-based system the household 
sector holds a larger portfolio of deposits and a smaller part in corporate investment. 
Fecht argues that moderately bank-dominated financial systems are fragile because 
fire sales of a single troubled bank can more readily cause asset-price deterioration 
that propels other banks into crisis. Conversely, fire sales by distressed banks are 
unlikely to cause a sudden drop in asset prices sufficiently large to trigger financial 
contagion in either market-oriented or extremely bank-dominated financial systems. 
In market-based financial systems, financial markets are deep and able to absorb fire 
sales with limited impact on prices. Alternatively, in strongly bank-dominated 
financial systems banks’ transactions in secondary financial markets affect only a 
rather limited segment of their balance sheets. Therefore, banks’ market exposure is 
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comparatively small and they are able to buffer fire sales that have a severe impact on 
asset prices when markets are relatively illiquid. In contrast, in moderately bank-
based financial systems banks depend on liquidity inflow from assets sales and are 
therefore more vulnerable to adverse price movements. Banks face considerable 
difficulty in compensating for the shortfall of liquidity inflows after the fire sales. 
 Empirical studies on the impact of financial development or capital market on 
macroeconomic variability provide only mixed support of the hypothesis that higher 
financial or capital market development leads to lower volatility. Silva (2002) applied 
generalized method of moments technique on cross-sectional data set and found that 
countries with more developed financial systems had smoother business cycle 
fluctuations. Interestingly, the inclusion of dummy variables representing bank-based 
or market-based financial structure does not affect the result and the coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero. Lopez and Spiegel (2002) found a significant 
negative relationship between financial development and income volatility from a 
cross-country panel, suggesting that financial development does mitigate economic 
fluctuations in the long run. 
Denizer et al. (2000) estimated fixed effects regressions with panel data and 
found that countries with more developed financial sectors experience smaller 
fluctuations in real per capita output, consumption, and investment growth. 
Phumiwasana (2003) empirically investigated relationships between financial 
structure, volatility, and economic growth. Using panel regressions, he found 
evidences that bank-based financial system increases the growth volatility among 
developed countries, while decreases growth volatility among developing countries. 
 Using cross-industry and cross-country data, Raddatz (2003) estimated the 
effect of financial development on volatility based on differences in sensitivity to 
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financial conditions across industries. The results show that sectors with larger 
liquidity needs are more volatile and experience deeper crises in financially 
underdeveloped countries. The result suggests that changes in financial development 
can generate important differences in aggregate volatility. This finding also provides 
indirect support to the theory that development of financial markets reduces 
macroeconomic volatility because it increases the ability of intermediaries to provide 
liquidity during periods of distress. Moreover, he found that the development of 
financial intermediaries is more important than the development of equity market for 
the reduction of volatility. 
In contrast to existing literatures, which primarily focus on the relationship 
between financial development and growth, this paper examines empirical 
relationships between capital market, financial development, and macroeconomic 
variability. The paper finds that output and investment volatilities are negatively 
related to measures of capital market development after controlling for other relevant 
variables. In addition, there are also some evidences that capital market development 
also lower consumption volatility. Empirical results support the theoretical prediction 
that capital market development would lead to lower volatility. 
 The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses measurement 
issues. Section 3 discusses data construction and data description. Section 4 provides 
methodology. Section 5 presents estimation results. Section 6 discusses robustness 
issues. Lastly, section 7 covers policy implications, and conclusion. 
2. Measurement Issues 
Financial Development 
Ideally, one would like measures of financial development, which indicate the degree 
to which the financial system ameliorates information asymmetry and facilitates the 
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mobilization and efficient allocation of capital. Particularly, one would prefer 
indicators that capture the effectiveness with which financial systems research firms 
and identify profitable investment, exert corporate control, facilitate risk management, 
mobilize saving, and ease transaction [Merton and Bodie (2004)]. Unfortunately, no 
such measures are available. As a result, one must rely on several proxies of financial 
development that existing empirical work shows are robustly related to economic 
growth or other components of aggregate output. 
 The most commonly used measure of financial development [e.g. Levine and 
King (1993), Denizer, et al. (2000)] is "Private Credit", defined as the ratio of 
domestic credit extended to the private sector by financial intermediaries to GDP. 
More specifically, domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for 
repayment. This measure captures the amount of credit channelled through financial 
intermediaries to the private sector. Beck et al. (2000) show that Private Credit is a 
good predictor of economic growth and the positive correlation between the two is not 
due to reverse causality. 
 The alternative measure is the "Liquidity Ratio", defined as the ratio of liquid 
liabilities (usually M3) to GDP. Levine and King (1993) introduce this variable under 
the name "Financial Depth" to proxy for the overall size of the formal financial 
intermediary sector relative to economic activity.  However, such monetary 
aggregates do not differentiate between the liabilities of various financial institutions, 
and may not be closely related to financial services such as risk management and 
information processing [Levine and King (1993)]. 
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 This study uses "Private Credit" as a primary measure of financial 
development. However, it also employs the "Liquidity Ratio" as an alternative 
measure for robustness check. 
Capital Market 
 Measures of capital market development can be broadly classified into two 
categories: absolute and relative measures. An absolute measure identifies the level of 
capital market development itself without reference to other developments in the 
financial system. Alternatively, a relative measure attempts to measure the importance 
of direct financing via capital markets relative to indirect financing via financial 
intermediaries, particularly banks. These measures were first developed to classify 
financial systems as bank-based or market-based systems [Levine (2002)]. Given that 
these relative measures compare different components of the financial system, they 
can be used as measures of financial structure. 
 Absolute measures of capital market development usually involve the size and 
liquidity of stock markets and/or bond markets [Beck and Levine (2002)]. Most cross-
country studies use only stock market data because bond market data are usually not 
available for emerging economies. The standard measure is the "Turnover Ratio", 
defined as the value of shares traded on domestic exchanges divided by the total value 
of listed shares. Basically, it indicates the trading volume of the stock market relative 
to its size. One advantage of this measure is that it is relatively immune to business 
cycle and asset price fluctuation because prices appear both in the numerator and the 
denominator. An alternative measure is "Value Traded", defined as the value of the 
trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. It measures trading 
relative to the size of the economy. Since value traded is the product of quantity and 
price, this indicator could rise just from favourable expectation of the future without 
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any increase in transactions activity. Turnover ratio does not suffer from this 
shortcoming. The other alternative measure is "Capitalization Ratio", defined as the 
total stock market capitalization over GDP. This measure suffers the same weakness 
as "Value Traded". This paper uses "Turnover Ratio" as an absolute measure of 
capital market development and uses "Value Traded" and "Capitalization Ratio" as 
alternative measures for robustness checks. 
 Relative measures of capital market development gauge the development of 
capital markets relative to that of financial intermediaries, particularly the banking 
sector. In the literature they are known as measures of "Financial Structure", 
indicating whether the financial system is market-based or bank-based. Since there is 
no single accepted definition of financial structure, Beck et al. (2001) construct 
several indicators where higher values indicate that a financial system is more market-
based. They aggregate these indicators into a single financial structure index. The first 
indicator is Structure-Activity, which measures stock market activity relative to that 
of banks. It is defined as the log of the ratio of Value Traded (defined as “value of 
total shares traded on the stock market divided by GDP”) over Bank Credit (defined 
as “the claims of the banking sector on the private sector as a share of GDP”).The 
second indicator is Structure-Size, which compares the sizes of the stock market and 
the banking sector. Specifically, it is defined as the log of the ratio of Market 
Capitalization and Bank Credit. Market Capitalization is defined as "the value of 
listed shares divided by GDP." Bank Credit represents the claims of the banking 
sector on the private sector as a share of GDP. Compared to Private Credit, this 
measure focuses on the commercial banking sector only, excluding the claims of non-
bank financial intermediaries. Levine (2002) also proposed another indicator, 
Structure-Efficiency, defined as the log of the value traded ratio multiplied by 
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overhead costs. Overhead costs equal the overhead costs of the banking system 
relative to banking system assets. 
 The aggregate measure of financial structure is the Structure-Aggregate index 
which combines the three previous measures. Specifically, it is the first principal 
component of Structure-Activity, Structure-Size and Structure-Efficiency. In previous 
studies [e.g. Levine (2002)], countries with a Structure-Aggregate index higher or 
equal to the sample mean are classified as having a market-based financial structure. 
Conversely, countries with an index lower than the sample mean are classified as 
having a bank-based financial structure. 
 This study uses the "Structure-Aggregate index" as a relative measure of 
capital market development. However, the structure-aggregate index was constructed 
as the first principal component of structure-activity and structure-size indices only. 
The reason is that data required to construct the structure-efficiency index are not 
available for a number of countries and periods. 
 The "Financial Structure Aggregate Index" is used mainly for robustness 
check, and more importantly for a comparison purpose with an absolute measure of 
capital market development, turnover ratio. By using the index as a relative measure 
of capital market development, the applied methodology here related financial 
structure and growth literature with this study. The interpretation of results in this 
study should not be that a country should pursue any particular form of  "financial 
structure" (bank-based or market-based), but rather whether a country also need well-
developed capital markets, and not only financial intermediaries, to achieve more 
stable financial system and lower volatilities. 
Page 12 of 40 
Business Cycle Volatility 
 There are two standard measures of business cycle volatility of output, namely 
standard deviation of growth rates of real GDP per capita, and standard deviation of 
business cycle components (filtered components) of a similar variable. In the first 
approach, growth rate is calculated by taking log difference. The second approach 
[e.g. Tiryaki (2003)] focuses on the magnitude of business cycle as a measure of 
macro-variability. The business cycle components are estimated using filtering 
technique [e.g. Hodrik-Prescott filter, Bakter-King filter]. This method is widely used 
among macroeconomist to smooth out business cycle. 
 This paper applied both approaches in measuring business cycle volatility. The 
filtering technique applied is Chistiano-Fitzgerald (CF) band-pass filters, which 
extract cyclical variations that last 2 to 8 years. Cyclical fluctuations in this frequency 
are widely considered to be associated with the business cycle [Haug and Dewald 
(2004)]. The applied filter was suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). This 
filter uses a non-symmetric moving average with changing weights. Every 
observation of a time series is filtered using the full sample. Another popular filter is 
the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. This filter amplifies the cyclical component 
and downplays the high frequency noise, but it still passes much of the high-
frequency noise outside the business cycle frequency [Stock and Watson (1998)]. The 
alternative band-pass filter that could also extract fluctuation from the 2 to 8 years 
frequency is Baxter and King (1995) filter. This filter is a symmetric centered moving 
average, where the weights are chosen to minimize the squared difference between 
the optimal and approximately optimal filters. The drawback of this filter, however, is 
that there would be loss of data at the beginning and ending of the series.  
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 For components of aggregate output, this paper use standard deviation of gross 
capital formation growth rate and standard deviation of household consumption 
growth rate as measures of investment and consumption volatility respectively. 
3. Data  
The panel covers annual data of 44 countries from 1975 to 2004. Data sources are 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), World Development Indicators (WDI), Barro-
Lee data set [Barro and Lee (2000)], Legal Origin and Creditor's Protection data set 
[La-Porta et al. (1998)], and Financial Structure data set [Levine (2002)].  Variable 
description and name list of countries in the sample classified by income level are in 
Appendix A and in Appendix B respectively. The annual data are transformed into six 
five-year-span panel data. Therefore, period 1 covers the years 1975-1979, period 2 
covers 1980-1984, period 3 covers 1985-1989, period 4 covers 1990-1994, period 5 
covers 1995-1999, and finally period 6 covers 2000-2004.  
 The transformation method is usually just the average, but for variables that 
measure volatilities (such as growth, or changes in terms of trade); the transformation 
involves the calculation of standard deviation of that variable within that particular 
observation period. Moreover, for robustness check, measures of financial 
development, capital market development, and income level are also transformed by 
using the initial values within the period.  
 The transformed variables are based on available annual data. Where the 
original annual data set shows missing data in certain years the transformations have 
been calculated if there are at least three valid data points for a given five-year time 
span. That criterion implies that more than 50% of observations for a given time-span 
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are valid. Otherwise, the data are considered missing for that particular observation in 
the panel.2  
 Table 1 shows business cycle volatilities across countries. Economic 
performance differs widely. This is true not only with growth rate but also with 
growth rate volatility and business cycle component volatility. Growth volatilities 
vary widely from very volatile of 10.2% to almost steady of 0.3%. High income 
countries tend to have lower both growth volatility and business cycle volatility. 
 Table 2 shows capital market development among countries from last period 
in the panel (year 2000-2004). Higher income countries tend to have more financial 
development, measured by private credit ratio. In addition, higher income countries 
also tend to have more market-based financial structure, measured by Financial 
Structure index. Interestingly, turnover ratio, as a measure of capital market 
development, does not have a stable relationship with income. 
 Table 3 and 4 provide descriptive statistics and correlations, respectively. 
Please note that many variables are already in log form (see Appendix A for variable 
description). Both measures of business cycle volatility, namely growth volatility (g-
vol) and business cycle component volatility (b-vol) are highly positively correlated (r 
= 0.91). Both, investment volatility (i-vol) and consumption volatility (c-vol) are 
positively correlated with both measure of output volatility (g-vol, b-vol) with 
correlations of 0.45 and 0.40 respectively. Interestingly, both investment and 
consumption volatility are relatively highly correlated with correlation of 0.68. 
                                                 
2 For example, the first five-year period runs from 1975-1979. If there are, say, four annual 
observations for variable X1 covering the years 1976-1979, then the transformation of those data into 
the panel is performed by averagingtheir values. However, if the observations onX1 cover only less 
than three years in any relevant five-year interval, say 1978-1979, then the relevant data point in the 
panel is listed as “n.a.:” (not available). This practice avoids loosing too many data points in the panel 
construction while the transformed data are still representative of the corresponding years. 
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 All volatilities (g-vol, b-vol, i-vol, c-vol) are negatively correlated with 
financial development (credit), income (gdp), and capital market development 
(turnover), and market-based financial structure (struc). This implies that countries 
with higher financial development, more advanced capital market, and higher income 
tend to have lower growth volatility and lower business cycle component variations. 
 Capital market development (turnover) is positively correlated with financial 
development (credit), and income (gdp). This means that countries with higher 
financial development and higher income tend to have more advanced capital market. 
 Income (gdp) and financial development (credit) is positively correlated. The 
correlation is 0.58. This means that countries with high income tend to have more 
developed financial system. 
4. Methodology 
The estimated model is a reduced-form equation relating volatility, financial 
development, and capital market development. 
σit = β0 + β1.FDit + β2.FSit + β3.Xit + εit 
σit is a measure of volatility. Depending on the specification, it could be log of 
standard deviation (sd.) of growth rate of output (g-vol), investment (i-vol), or 
consumption (c-vol), or sd. of CF-filtered log of output (b-vol). FD is a measure of 
financial development, namely log of private credit ratio (credit). FS is a measure of 
capital market development. An absolute and a relative measure would be log of 
turnover ratio (turnover) and financial structure-aggregate index (struc), respectively. 
X is a vector of standard controlled variables [see e.g. Lopez and Spiegel (2002), 
Beck et al. (2003)] 
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 The above reduced-form equation would be estimated by panel estimation; 
including pooled, random effects and fixed effects with robust variance [see e.g. 
Greene (2003) pp.314-318]. Furthermore, to take into account possible reverse 
causalities and endogeneity problems of financial development or capital market 
development, initial value of suspected variables instead of the average values of each 
sub-period will also be used in the estimation. In addition, instrumental variable 
estimation would be performed for robustness checks. Instruments for financial 
development are time trend, legal origin and creditor's protection index [La-Porta, et 
al. (1998)]. In case of panel instrumental variable estimation, instruments are time 
trend, creditor's protection index, and human capital index. Controlled variables (X) 
include the following. 
Income Level [log of real gdp per capita (gdp)] 
 The level of income is included to control for the fact that developing 
countries tend to experience much more volatility than developed countries [Easterly 
et al. (2000)] 
Openness [log of openness ratio (openness)] 
 The effect of trade openness on volatility is ambiguous. On one hand, 
reductions of barriers to trade may increase countries’ susceptibility to external 
shocks. On the other hand, trade with other countries can reduce the impact of 
domestic shocks. This volume variable is measured by the share of trade (export + 
import) in GDP. Our analysis does not include any measure of financial openness 
since the empirical literature [e.g. Buch et al. (2005)] has not been able to establish a 
statistically significant link between financial openness and business cycle volatility. 
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Government Consumption Spending over GDP (gcon) 
 There is general consensus at least among Keynesian macroeconomists that 
government has a role in promoting economic stabilization. Fiscal policy is an 
effective tool to counter business cycles. The mean of government consumption 
spending over GDP is included to take this fact into account.  
Standard Deviation of Changes in Real Effective Exchange Rate (sd-dreer) 
 One intensely debated topics of international macroeconomics is which 
exchange rate regime (fixed or floating) promotes greater stability of output. The 
answer depends on the type of shock that hits the economy. A fixed exchange rate is 
better if monetary shocks dominate, whereas floating is better if real shocks 
dominates [Karras and Song (1996)]. The standard measure of exchange-rate 
flexibility is the standard deviation of the real effective exchange rate. The data can be 
obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Standard Deviation of Changes in Terms of Trade (sd-dtot) 
 The standard deviation of changes in the terms of trade is a proxy for the 
extent to which an economy is exposed to real shocks. Raddatz (2005) finds that 
among low-income countries, changes in commodity price are the most important 
external shocks. However, since changes in the terms of trade affect the economy 
through relative price movements of imported input and exported output, they only 
affect the tradable sector of an economy directly, whereas the non-tradable sector 
might be affected only indirectly. Therefore, countries with large non-tradable sectors 
will be relatively less affected by fluctuations in the terms of trade. This fact is 
controlled for by including an openness ratio (ratio of trade over GDP) in the analysis. 
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Legal Origin 
 Legal systems with European origin can be classified into four major families: 
the English Common Law and the French, German, and Scandinavian Civil Law 
countries. Civil Law has its root in Roman law, and uses primarily legal codes to 
resolve particular cases. Unlike Civil Law, the English legal system is based on the 
Common Law where judges primarily formed the law in the course of trying to 
resolve particular cases. La-Porta, et al. (1998) show that common law countries 
generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protection of 
investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle.   
 Since most countries have acquired their legal system through occupation and 
colonization, legal origin can be regarded as relatively exogenous. In addition, La-
Porta, et al. (1998) have shown that the legal origin of a country materially influences 
the rights of its creditors and shareholders, its accounting standards, and the efficiency 
of contract enforcement. Furthermore, Levine et al. (1999) have shown that legal 
origin explains cross-country variations in the level of financial development. 
Creditor’s Protection 
 The creditor protection index shows how well a country protects the claims of 
secured creditors in the case of company restructuring or liquidation. It ranges from 0 
to 4 and is composed of four dummy variables that indicate whether (1) the 
restructuring procedure imposes an automatic stay on assets that prevents secured 
creditors from taking possession of loan collateral; (2) secured creditors are ranked 
first in the case of liquidation; (3) management does stay in charge of the firm during 
restructuring, thereby enhancing creditors’ power; and (4) management needs 
creditors’ consent when filing for restructuring. Basically, higher values of Creditor 
Protection mean that outside investors have more rights relative to the management 
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and other stakeholders. This implies that outside investors should be more willing to 
provide external finance. 
5. Estimation Results 
Table 5 and 6 show estimation results of growth volatility (g-vol) using turnover ratio 
(turnover) and financial structure aggregate index (struc), respectively.  In pooled 
estimation, both measures are negatively significant. This suggests that higher capital 
market development is associated with lower growth volatility. Interestingly, private 
credit (credit), a measure of financial development, and income level (gdp) are not 
significant, though still have negative signs as expected. These results still hold after 
controlling for random individual effects (in RE estimation). However, using 
Hausman test, we reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation of individual effects 
and other predictors (random effects assumption) in favour of fixed effects estimation, 
which does not rely on this assumption. In fixed effects estimation, we rejected the 
hypothesis of no individual effects, using F-statistic. Furthermore, previous results 
still hold, and coefficients of turnover ratio (turnover) and structure index (struc) are 
nearly double. To avoid reverse causality, initial values of turnover ratio, financial 
structure index, private credit, and income level were used in fixed effects estimation 
(FEI). The results are still consistent with previous findings.  
 To take into account possible endogeneity of financial and capital market 
development, instrumental variable estimation (IV) were conducted. Turnover ratio 
(turnover) and structure index (struc) are still negatively significant and the 
coefficients are even more negative than those in pooled estimation. The last columns 
report results from fixed effects IV estimation (IVFE). Unlike in normal fixed effects, 
we cannot reject null hypothesis of no individual effects, using F-statistic. This 
Page 20 of 40 
validates previous results from IV estimation. Interestingly, both turnover and struc 
are not significant, though still have negative signs. 
 Among other explanatory variables, only trade openness ratio (openness) is 
consistently significant across various estimation methods. After controlling for 
country fixed effects, higher trade openness is associated with lower growth volatility. 
 Table 7 and 8 show estimation results of business cycle component volatility 
(b-vol) using turnover ratio (turnover) and financial structure aggregate index (struc), 
respectively. With turnover ratio (turnover) as an absolute measure of capital market 
development, results are broadly similar to previous cases of growth volatility. 
Turnover ratio is consistently significant with negative signs across different 
estimation methods except in fixed effects instrumental variables estimation (IVFE). 
Both Hausman and F statistics justify the use of fixed effects. Using Hausman 
statistic, we reject null hypothesis of zero correlation between individual effects and 
other predictors, and using F statistic, we reject null hypothesis of no individual 
effects. 
 In sharp contrast, structure index (struc) as a relative measure of capital 
market development, is not significant under most estimation methods except in fixed 
effects using initial value data (FEI) and instrumental variable estimation (IV). 
However, the signs are consistently negative. 
 Surprisingly, private credit (credit), a measure of financial development, is 
almost always not significant. Income level (gdp) is negatively significant in pooled, 
random effects, and IV estimation, but becomes insignificant with positive signs after 
we controlled for fixed effects. 
 Among other explanatory variables, trade openness ratio (openness) and real 
effective exchange rate volatility (sd-dreer) are consistently significant. Similar to the 
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case of growth volatility, higher trade openness is associated with lower business 
cycle component volatility after controlling for country fixed effects. On the other 
hand, higher real exchange rate volatility is consistently associated with higher 
volatility of business cycle. 
 Table 9 and 10 show estimation results of investment volatility (i-growth) 
using turnover ratio (turnover) and financial structure aggregate index (struc), 
respectively. Both measures are negatively significant across all estimation methods. 
Using Chi2 statistics in random effects estimation, and F statistics in fixed effects 
estimation, we rejected null hypothesis of no individual effect. From Hausman 
statistics, we cannot reject hypothesis of zero correlation between individual effects 
and other predictors. In this case, both random and fixed effects estimators are 
consistent, but random effects estimator is also efficient. Interestingly, turnover ratio 
(turnover) and financial structure index (struc) are negatively significant even in fixed 
effects instrumental variable estimation (IVFE). 
 Private credit (credit), a measure of financial development, is negatively 
significant in both pooled and random effects estimation. However, though still has 
negative signs, it became insignificant once we controlled for possible endogeniety in 
IV estimation. Income level (gdp) is not significant in any estimation. 
 Among other explanatory variables, only real effective exchange rate volatility 
(sd-dreer) is consistently positively significant across various estimation methods. The 
results suggest that higher real exchange rate volatility is associated with higher 
investment volatility. 
 Table 11 and 12 show estimation results of consumption volatility (c-vol) 
using turnover ratio (turnover) and financial structure aggregate index (struc), 
respectively. Though, both measures are significant under certain estimation methods, 
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there is no evidence of robust relationship. Income level (gdp) is negatively 
significant under most estimation methods. This result seems to suggest that rich 
countries have better ways to smooth out consumption variability. Private credit, a 
measure of financial development, is not significant under any estimation method. 
Other explanatory variables are also not consistently significant, except real exchange 
rate volatility (sd-dreer), which is positively significant when financial structure index 
(struc) is used as a measure of capital market development. 
6. Robustness Check 
For robustness check, estimations are also performed using alternative measures of 
financial and capital market development. More specifically, liquidity ratio 
(M3/GDP) is used instead of private credit ratio (private credit/GDP) to measure a 
degree of financial development. Value traded ratio (stock value traded/GDP) and 
market capitalization ratio (stock market capitalization/GDP) are used instead of 
turnover ratio (stock value traded/stock market capitalization) as a measure of capital 
market development. The results, not reported here, are that major findings from 
previous sections do not materially change with alternative measures. In both growth 
volatility and investment volatility regressions, coefficients of value traded ratio and 
market capitalization ratio are consistently significant with negative sign. However, 
they are not significant in explaining consumption growth volatility, but this is the 
same result we found with turnover ratio and private credit ratio. 
 Other plausible relevant variables (e.g. standard deviation of inflation, average 
inflation rate, and investment ratio) are also included in the estimation, but have never 
been significant. Therefore, they are dropped from the reported tables. 
Page 23 of 40 
7. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
The above econometric analysis supports theoretical prediction that the development 
of capital markets reduces output, investment, and consumption volatilities. The 
coefficients of alternative measures of capital market development are significant in 
most specifications with negative signs. Nevertheless, the values of the coefficients 
are rather small, always less than unity. This raises the question whether the effect of 
capital market development on aggregate volatility is economically meaningful, even 
if it is statistically significant. 
 To investigate the above question, the simple calculation below use a 
coefficient of log of turnover ratio (turnover) from fixed effects estimation (FEI) of 
growth volatility in Table 5 as a benchmark. The coefficient is -0.16.  The inter-
quartile range of turnover ratio in the sample is 49.36. In terms of log difference, it is 
1.67. Therefore, the effect of an inter-quartile improvement in turnover ratio is -0.27 
(-0.16 * 1.67) or a reduction of 27% of volatility (note that: the left-hand side variable 
is log of volatility). The average growth volatility is 2.1%. Therefore, a decrease of 
27% would mean a decrease of 0.50 percentage point (2.1-2.1*exp(-0.27)) in standard 
deviation of growth rate. 
 In summary, capital market does exert a statistically significant influence on 
volatility, and the magnitude of the decrease in volatility is quite large. However, 
when we measure the change in absolute terms  as the proportionate change of the 
standard deviation of growth, then the size of the effect seems to be quite small, 
approximately half a percentage point. 
 To conclude, this chapter investigates the effect of capital market development 
on output, investment and consumption volatilities in forty-four countries using data 
from 1975 to 2004 period. The main result is that output, investment and consumption 
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volatilities are negatively related to measures of capital market development after 
controlling for other relevant variables. Hence, the empirical findings corroborate the 
theoretical prediction that more advaced capital market is associated with lower 
volatilities. 
 Interestingly, econometric analysis here could not find robust negative 
relationship between financial development and output volatility as in previous 
studies [e.g. Silva (2002), Tiryaki (2003)]. Nevertheless, the evidence here suggests 
that there is a significant negative relationship between financial development and 
investment volatility. This study also found that income level (gdp) has a relatively 
robust negative relationship with consumption volatility. 
 The next interesting question would be whether capital market development 
affects economic stability in some other ways. It may be the case that capital market 
development affects the likelihood of a recession occurring, or its depth. Moreover, 
little is known about the mechanism by which the deepening of capital markets affects 
aggregate volatility. These are interesting topics for future research. 
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Table 1: Business Cycle Volatility (%) classified by Income Level. 
(Data cover six 5-year time span from 1975-2004 for 44 countries) 
 
 Standard deviation of growth rate (%) Standard deviation of filtered log GDP p.c. (%)
COUNTRY Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min 
High Income 1.8 1.6 6.4 0.3 1.2 1.0 3.9 0.2
Australia 1.8 1.4 4.1 0.7 1.1 1.0 2.4 0.4
Belgium 1.6 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.6
Canada 1.8 1.4 3.3 0.7 1.3 1.2 2.0 0.6
Denmark 1.8 2.0 2.4 0.3 1.0 1.1 1.4 0.5
Finland 1.9 1.6 3.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 2.1 0.4
France 1.0 1.1 1.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5
Germany 1.2 1.1 2.7 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.5
Greece 1.8 1.8 2.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 2.3 0.2
Iceland 2.6 3.0 3.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.9 0.3
Ireland 3.0 3.0 3.7 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.3 1.4
Israel 2.5 2.3 4.5 1.2 1.7 1.9 2.5 0.5
Italy 1.1 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.4
Japan 1.3 1.5 2.0 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.2
Korea, South 2.7 1.8 6.0 1.2 1.9 1.7 3.9 0.8
Netherlands 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 2.0 0.5
New Zealand 2.1 1.9 3.3 0.8 1.1 1.0 2.1 0.6
Norway 1.4 1.3 2.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.7 0.5
Portugal 1.8 2.2 2.5 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.7
Singapore 3.9 3.8 6.4 0.8 2.5 2.9 3.3 1.4
Spain 1.4 1.3 2.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.2
Sweden 1.3 1.3 2.1 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.5
Switzerland 1.7 1.6 2.6 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.8 0.7
United Kingdom 1.2 1.0 2.2 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.6
United States 1.7 1.3 4.0 0.8 1.3 1.1 2.2 0.8
Upper Middle Income 3.9 3.3 10.2 0.6 2.7 2.1 6.5 1.0
Argentina 6.1 6.2 8.8 3.5 4.2 4.0 5.6 2.9
Brazil 3.2 2.8 5.4 1.6 1.9 1.6 3.8 1.1
Chile 4.3 3.7 7.4 2.7 2.7 1.9 5.7 1.6
Malaysia 3.2 2.9 7.2 0.6 2.3 2.1 4.6 1.1
Mexico 3.1 2.9 5.3 1.0 1.7 1.6 2.7 1.2
South Africa 2.0 1.7 3.9 0.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.0
Uruguay 4.7 3.6 9.1 1.9 3.3 2.9 5.4 2.2
Venezuela 4.9 4.3 10.2 2.2 3.4 3.2 6.5 1.9
Lower Middle Income 3.4 2.6 7.9 0.7 2.2 2.1 5.8 0.3
Columbia 1.8 1.6 3.6 0.7 1.0 0.9 2.1 0.3
Ecuador 2.6 2.6 3.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.0 0.9
Indonesia 4.1 2.6 7.9 2.1 2.8 1.9 5.5 1.2
Morocco 4.5 4.5 7.1 2.0 2.5 2.6 3.4 1.3
Philippines 3.3 2.5 5.8 2.0 2.6 2.5 3.8 1.2
Thailand 2.8 2.0 7.6 0.9 1.8 1.5 4.6 0.4
Turkey 4.8 4.7 5.9 3.6 2.9 2.7 3.7 2.3
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Table 1 (continued)  
 Standard deviation of growth rate (%) Standard deviation of filtered log GDP p.c. (%)
COUNTRY Mean Median Max Min Mean Median Max Min 
Low Income 3.2 2.6 9.0 0.4 2.2 1.8 5.7 0.4
China 3.1 3.4 5.5 0.4 1.9 1.9 3.8 0.4
Cote d'lvoire 2.9 2.6 6.5 0.7 2.4 2.5 4.3 0.5
India 2.4 2.1 5.6 1.2 1.8 1.6 3.4 0.8
Nigeria 5.3 4.5 9.0 3.2 3.4 3.3 5.7 1.4
Pakistan 2.1 1.9 3.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.1 0.9
All 2.6 2.1 10.2 0.3 1.7 1.4 6.5 0.2
 
Table 2: Capital Market Development among countries 
(Data cover last panel period of year 2000-2004 for 44 countries) 
 
COUNTRY 
Private Credit 
Ratio 
Turnover  
Ratio 
Financial 
Structure 
Index 
High Income 113.6 91.9 1.3
Australia 93.6 69.8 1.7
Belgium 76.4 21.3 0.8
Canada 81.0 65.1 1.8
Denmark 147.8 69.7 0.6
Finland 61.0 94.3 2.7
France 87.6 81.5 1.5
Germany 116.2 118.1 0.8
Greece 66.7 42.0 1.2
Iceland 125.0 57.6 1.0
Ireland 117.2 40.1 0.7
Israel 91.2 62.7 1.2
Italy 82.7 105.8 1.1
Japan 151.6 79.2 0.3
Korea, South 97.6 289.4 1.5
Netherlands 149.9 120.9 1.6
New Zealand 115.4 41.3 0.2
Norway 68.6 88.3 1.1
Portugal 146.7 55.0 0.3
Singapore 115.2 54.1 2.1
Spain 108.7 179.0 1.5
Sweden 91.7 112.0 1.9
Switzerland 158.4 86.2 2.1
United Kingdom 143.4 103.4 1.8
United States 232.4 169.7 1.3
Upper Middle Income 57.3 22.1 0.9
Argentina 16.3 6.5 1.0
Brazil 35.4 34.6 0.4
Chile 64.0 8.7 1.1
Malaysia 141.2 30.3 1.2
Mexico 17.3 27.4 0.7
South Africa 124.1 45.5 1.6
Uruguay 49.4 n.a. n.a.
Venezuela 11.0 1.7 0.0
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Table 2 (continued) 
COUNTRY 
Private Credit 
Ratio 
Turnover  
Ratio 
Financial 
Structure 
Index 
Lower Middle Income 39.0 75.0 0.2
Columbia 24.5 4.0 -0.6
Ecuador 24.2 2.0 -1.3
Indonesia 20.4 229.5 1.0
Morocco 56.1 8.0 -0.3
Philippines 37.1 11.5 0.6
Thailand 101.4 96.8 0.8
Turkey 19.2 173.2 1.4
Low Income 44.4 125.8 0.6
China 134.8 100.1 0.4
Cote d'lvoire 14.7 1.7 -0.4
India 31.9 145.1 1.4
Nigeria 15.4 10.5 0.5
Pakistan 25.3 371.7 1.2
All 82.6 81.7 1.0
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
   Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations
G-VOL 0.7 0.8 2.3 -1.3 0.7 270
B-VOL 0.3 0.3 1.9 -1.5 0.7 270
C-VOL 1.1 1.0 8.2 -0.9 1.0 247
I-VOL 2.3 2.2 5.6 -0.1 0.7 251
TURNOVER 3.2 3.5 5.9 -1.0 1.3 230
STRUC 0.0 0.2 2.7 -4.8 1.3 225
CREDIT 3.9 4.0 5.4 -0.1 0.8 269
GDP 9.1 9.4 10.5 6.5 1.0 270
OPENNESS 4.0 4.0 5.8 2.3 0.6 270
GCON 16.2 15.5 38.7 0.0 5.7 270
SD-DREER 7.6 5.3 47.7 0.5 7.3 222
SD-DTOT 7.0 4.6 44.6 0.6 6.9 242
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Table 4: Selected pairwise correlations 
 
 G-VOL B-VOL C-VOL I-VOL TURNOVER STRUC CREDIT GDP OPENNESS GCON SD-DREER SD-DTOT 
G-VOL 1.00                       
B-VOL 0.82 1.00                     
C-VOL 0.40 0.40 1.00                   
I-VOL 0.45 0.45 0.68 1.00                 
TURNOVER -0.25 -0.27 -0.23 -0.40 1.00               
STRUC -0.17 -0.15 -0.31 -0.27 0.57 1.00             
CREDIT -0.37 -0.35 -0.32 -0.40 0.45 0.40 1.00           
GDP -0.38 -0.43 -0.38 -0.27 0.37 0.37 0.58 1.00         
OPENNESS -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.34 0.23 0.24 1.00       
GCON -0.33 -0.34 -0.21 -0.17 0.07 0.16 0.31 0.52 0.28 1.00     
SD-DREER 0.33 0.38 0.28 0.34 -0.30 -0.17 -0.33 -0.39 -0.17 -0.24 1.00   
SD-DTOT 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.23 -0.34 -0.38 -0.45 -0.50 -0.22 -0.36 0.46 1.00 
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Table 5: Growth Volatility - using absolute measure of capital market development 
 
G-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE   
TURNOVER -0.10 *** -0.11*** -0.17** -0.16** -0.29 ** -0.03   
  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.13)   (0.22)   
CREDIT -0.07   -0.04   0.12   0.08   0.26   -1.02   
  (0.12)   (0.13)   (0.19)   (0.18)   (0.33)   (0.70)   
GDP -0.11   -0.13   0.39   0.61   -0.14   0.87   
  (0.09)   (0.10)   (0.43)   (0.38)   (0.14)   (0.86)   
OPENNESS 0.31 *** 0.28*** -0.63** -0.70*** 0.24 *** -0.54   
  (0.07)   (0.08)   (0.29)   (0.27)   (0.09)   (0.44)   
GCON -0.03 *** -0.03*** 0.03   0.03   -0.03 *** 0.03   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.02 *** 0.02*** 0.01   0.01   0.03 *** 0.05***
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT -0.02 * -0.02* -0.02   -0.01   -0.03 ** -0.02   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   
Observations 177.00   177.00   177.00   177.00   163.00   149.00   
No. of countries -   44.00   44.00   44.00   -   40.00   
R2 0.30   0.03   0.12   0.14   0.23   0.00   
F / Chi2 10.48 *** 53.43*** 3.33*** 3.78*** 11.56 *** 177.64***
Fu / Chi2u -   0.35   1.74*** 1.86*** -   1.04   
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.86   -0.91   -   -0.80   
Hausman -  31.35*** -  -  -  -  
J stat -   -  -  0.45   0.05   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 6: Growth Volatility - using relative measure of capital market development 
 
G-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE  
STRUC -0.07 ** -0.08** -0.16** -0.19*** -0.13 * -0.04   
  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.08)   (0.19)   
CREDIT -0.12   -0.09   0.01   -0.05   0.07   -1.05   
  (0.12)   (0.13)   (0.19)   (0.19)   (0.30)   (0.72)   
GDP -0.11   -0.13   0.57   0.87** -0.18   0.94   
  (0.09)   (0.10)   (0.41)   (0.40)   (0.14)   (0.99)   
OPENNESS 0.36 *** 0.34*** -0.53* -0.52   0.39 *** -0.50   
  (0.08)   (0.09)   (0.30)   (0.33)   (0.07)   (0.49)   
GCON -0.03 *** -0.02** 0.03   0.03   -0.03 *** 0.03   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.03 *** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.02* 0.03 *** 0.05***
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT -0.02   -0.02* -0.02   -0.02   -0.02 ** -0.02   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   
Observations 177.00   177.00   177.00   173.00   164.00   150.00   
No. of countries -   44.00   44.00   45.00   -   41.00   
R2 0.29   0.03   0.12   0.13   0.29   0.00   
F / Chi2 11.11 *** 56.41*** 3.04*** 2.87*** 13.21 *** 182.97***
Fu / Chi2u -   0.45   1.80*** 1.79*** -   1.09   
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.90   -0.93   -   -0.81   
Hausman -   32.99*** -   -   -  -  
J stat -  -  -  -  3.22   0.02   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 7: Business Cycle Volatility - using absolute measure of capital market 
development 
 
B-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE  
TURNOVER -0.10 *** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.39 *** -0.01   
  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.12)   (0.16)   
CREDIT 0.02   0.10   0.15   0.10   0.73 ** -0.07   
  (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.15)   (0.13)   (0.37)   (0.51)   
GDP -0.15 * -0.22** 0.32   0.50* -0.29 ** 0.00   
  (0.08)   (0.11)   (0.34)   (0.29)   (0.15)   (0.62)   
OPENNESS 0.26 *** 0.03   -1.02*** -1.07*** 0.18 * -1.16***
  (0.08)   (0.13)   (0.28)   (0.27)   (0.10)   (0.32)   
GCON -0.02   0.00   0.05** 0.05** -0.02   0.03   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.03 *** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03 *** 0.04***
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT -0.01   -0.01   0.00   0.00   -0.02   -0.02   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 177.00   177.00   177.00   177.00   163.00   149.00   
No. of countries -   44.00   44.00   44.00   -   40.00   
R2 0.31   0.10   0.24   0.25   -   0.28   
F / Chi2 8.17 *** 32.03*** 5.56*** 5.77*** 8.83 *** 78.75***
Fu / Chi2u -   7.98*** 3.62*** 3.81*** -   3.13***
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.86   -0.89   -   -0.81   
Hausman -   22.00*** -   -   -  -  
J stat -  -  -  -  0.35   0.04   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 8: Business Cycle Volatility - using relative measure of capital market 
development 
 
B-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE   
STRUC -0.03   -0.06   -0.09   -0.12 ** -0.20 ** -0.02   
  (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.09)   (0.14)   
CREDIT -0.04   0.03   0.08   0.00   0.54   -0.08   
  (0.12)   (0.13)   (0.15)   (0.13)   (0.36)   (0.52)   
GDP -0.17 ** -0.24 ** 0.33   0.59 * -0.36 ** 0.04   
  (0.09)   (0.12)   (0.33)   (0.31)   (0.16)   (0.71)   
OPENNESS 0.29 *** 0.08   -1.01 *** -0.97 *** 0.37 *** -1.14 ***
  (0.09)   (0.13)   (0.30)   (0.33)   (0.09)   (0.36)   
GCON -0.01   0.00   0.05 ** 0.05 ** -0.02   0.04   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 177.00   177.00   177.00   173.00   164.00   150.00   
No. of countries -   44.00   44.00   45.00   -   41.00   
R2 0.29   0.08   0.22   0.22   0.08   0.28   
F / Chi2 8.20 *** 31.42 *** 4.25 *** 4.18 *** 9.49 *** 82.41 ***
Fu / Chi2u -   8.75 *** 3.64 *** 3.56 *** -   3.42 ***
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.88   -0.91   -   -0.81   
Hausman -   113.44 *** -   -   -  -  
J stat -  -  -  -  4.07   0.03   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 9: Investment Volatility - using absolute measure of capital market 
development 
 
I-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE   
TURNOVER -0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.17 *** -0.15 *** -0.32 *** -0.31 * 
  (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.11)   (0.17)   
CREDIT -0.28 *** -0.20 * -0.13   -0.12   -0.03   -0.40   
  (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.13)   (0.14)   (0.33)   (0.57)   
GDP 0.11   -0.07   -0.36   -0.21   0.06   0.58   
  (0.09)   (0.12)   (0.43)   (0.38)   (0.17)   (0.84)   
OPENNESS 0.14   0.00   -0.09   -0.20   0.11   -0.45   
  (0.12)   (0.16)   (0.31)   (0.31)   (0.11)   (0.38)   
GCON -0.02 * 0.00   0.04   0.04   -0.03 ** 0.00   
  (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 *** 0.02 ** 0.03 ***
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT 0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.01   
  (0.01)   -(0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 166.00   166.00   166.00   166.00   152.00   138.00   
No. of countries -   42.00   42.00   42.00   -   38.00   
R2 0.30   0.18   0.21   0.19   0.32   0.22   
F / Chi2 11.75 *** 51.67 *** 4.53 *** 3.84 *** 10.37 *** 2576.02 ***
Fu / Chi2u -   93.13 *** 4.78 *** 4.77 *** -   3.37 ***
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.27   -0.14   -   -0.43   
Hausman -   -1.32   -   -   -  -  
 J stat -  -  -  -  3.35   0.56   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 10: Investment Volatility - using relative measure of capital market 
development 
 
I-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE   
STRUC -0.13 * -0.12 * -0.11 * -0.15 *** -0.26 *** -0.31 * 
  (0.07)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.08)   (0.17)   
CREDIT -0.37 *** -0.29 *** -0.23  * -0.23   -0.04   -0.55   
  (0.10)   (0.11)   (0.14)   (0.15)   (0.32)   (0.62)   
GDP 0.09   -0.09   -0.31   0.04   -0.01   1.00   
  (0.10)   (0.13)   (0.43)   (0.42)   (0.17)   (1.03)   
OPENNESS 0.22 * 0.06   -0.06   -0.16   0.27 ** -0.14   
  (0.12)   (0.17)   (0.33)   (0.36)   (0.12)   (0.44)   
GCON -0.01   0.01   0.04   0.05   -0.02   0.03   
  (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 ***
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT 0.00   0.00   -0.01   -0.01   0.00   -0.01   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 166.00   166.00   166.00   161.00   153.00   139.00   
No. of countries -   42.00   42.00   42.00   -   39.00   
R2 0.27   0.17   0.19   0.19   0.21   0.12   
F / Chi2 8.75 *** 41.89 *** 4.10 *** 4.64 *** 9.40 *** 2328.14 ***
Fu / Chi2u -   88.15 *** 4.84 *** 4.32 *** -   3.22 ***
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.19   -0.14   -   -0.72   
Hausman -   8.21   -   -   -  -  
J stat -  -  -  -  2.05   0.32   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 11: Consumption Volatility - using absolute measure of capital market 
development 
 
C-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE   
TURNOVER -0.09   -0.13 ** -0.11   -0.04   -0.35 ** -0.48 ***
  (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.18)   (0.18)   
CREDIT -0.17   0.07   0.33   0.24   0.10   0.39   
  (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.21)   (0.22)   (0.45)   (0.62)   
GDP -0.25 ** -0.48 *** -1.74 *** -1.44 ** -0.27   -0.54   
  (0.11)   (0.17)   (0.71)   (0.66)   (0.24)   (0.92)   
OPENNESS 0.19   0.05   0.51   0.21   0.17   0.16   
  (0.11)   (0.17)   (0.42)   (0.41)   (0.13)   (0.41)   
GCON -0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02   -0.02   -0.03   
  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.03)   
SD-DREER 0.02 *** 0.02 * 0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.01   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
Observations 166.00   166.00   166.00   166.00   152.00   138.00   
No. of countries -   42.00   42.00   42.00   -   38.00   
R2 0.19   0.15   0.19   0.15   0.16   0.12   
F / Chi2 10.46 *** 33.72 *** 3.68 *** 2.57 ** 12.43 *** 439.50 ***
Fu / Chi2u -   169.30 *** 7.56 *** 7.14 *** -   6.58 ***
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.81   -0.70   -   -0.45   
Hausman -   4.53   -   -   -  -  
J stat -  -  -  -  3.64   0.23   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Table 12: Consumption Volatility - using relative measure of capital market 
development 
 
C-VOL Pool   RE   FE   FEI   IV   IVFE   
STRUC -0.20 * -0.16   -0.11   -0.08   -0.21 ** -0.46 ** 
  (0.11)   (0.10)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.11)   (0.19)   
CREDIT -0.18   0.00   0.25   0.19   0.21   0.17   
  (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.20)   (0.23)   (0.42)   (0.68)   
GDP -0.20   -0.43 ** -1.61 *** -1.32 ** -0.41 * 0.04   
  (0.14)   (0.19)   (0.61)   (0.68)   -(0.22)   (1.13)   
OPENNESS 0.30 *** 0.18   0.57   0.39   0.29 ** 0.62   
  (0.12)   (0.19)   (0.46)   (0.44)   (0.12)   (0.48)   
GCON -0.01   0.01   0.01   0.02   -0.01   0.02   
  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.04)   
SD-DREER 0.03 *** 0.02 ** 0.01   0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 ** 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   
SD-DTOT -0.02   -0.01   -0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.01   
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   
Observations 166.00   166.00   166.00   161.00   153.00   139.00   
No. of countries -   42.00   42.00   42.00   -   39.00   
R2 0.22   0.15   0.19   0.19   0.21   0.00   
F / Chi2 11.04 *** 33.75 *** 3.25 *** 3.77 *** 13.93 *** 385.87 ***
Fu / Chi2u -   157.02 *** 7.09 *** 6.77 *** -   5.49 ***
Correlation(Xb, ui) -   -   -0.77   -0.65   -   -0.32   
Hausman -   6.01   -   -   -  -  
J stat -  -  -  -  5.00 * 0.42   
 
Note: robust standard error in parenthesis. * sig. at 10%, **  sig. at 5%, *** sig. at 1% 
Pool= pooled estimation, RE = random effects, FE= fixed effects, FEI= fixed effects 
using initial value data of lturnover, lcredit and lgdp, IV= instrumental variable 
estimation (instruments: time trend, legal origin, creditor's protection index), IVFE= 
fixed effects instrumental estimation (instruments: time trend, creditor's protection 
index, human capital index) 
 
R2 = R2  or Within-R2 [squared correlation between ( )it iy y−  and ˆ( ).it ix x β− ]  
F / Chi2 = F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of all Xs except constant 
Fu / Chi2u =  F or Chi2 statistics for testing sig. of cross-sectional individual effects, 
Corr(Xb,ui)= correlation of predicted valued (Xb) and individual fixed effects (ui) 
Hausman = Hausman Chi2 statistics for testing of no-correlation between ui and Xs 
J stat = J statistics for GMM overeidentifying test  
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Appendix A: Variables 
 
 
Variables Description 
g-vol log (sd. of growth rate of gdp per capita) 
b-vol log (sd. of business cycle component of gdp per capita) 
c-vol log (sd. of household consumption growth rate) 
i-vol log (sd. of gross capital formation growth rate) 
turnover log (turnover ratio) = log (value of shares traded / GDP) 
struc financial structure- aggregate index 
credit log (private credit ratio) = log (private credit / GDP) 
gdp log (gdp per capita) 
openness log (openness ratio) = log ([export + import] / GDP) 
gcon government consumption over gdp ratio 
sd-dreer sd. of changes in real effective exchange rate 
sd-dtot sd. of changes in terms of trade 
 
 
Appendix B: Countries covered (44) classified by 
Income Level 
 
High Income (24): Australia Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany 
Greece Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Netherlands New_Zealand Norway 
Portugal Singapore Spain Sweden Switzerland United_Kingdom United_States 
 
Upper Middle Income (8): Argentina Brazil Chile Malaysia Mexico South_Africa 
Uruguay Venezuela 
 
Lower Middle Income (7): Columbia Ecuador Indonesia Morocco Philippines 
Thailand Turkey 
 
Low Income (5): Bangladesh Cote_d'lvoire India Nigeria Pakistan China 
